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Aid for Trade has been recognized as a tool to integrate developing coun-
tries into the world economy, induce economic growth and lift its people 
out of poverty. EU and its member states are the biggest donors of Aid for 
Trade in the world, and one of its biggest advocates, but neither Aid for 
Trade nor the allocation of the European donors, have been subject for 
much earlier research. What has been heavily investigated is development 
aid, where studies have found that aid is allocated according to the needs 
and merit of the recipient countries, but that the self-interest of the donor 
tend to outweigh the other motives. This might undermine the effectiveness 
of aid since it has been suggested that aid is more efficiently and effective if 
given to poor countries with good policies.  
This thesis address the gap in research about Aid for Trade, and examine if 
need, merit or self-interest motivates the European donors. A panel data set 
is constructed using 142 developing countries and is analysed using OLS 
regression and fixed effects model. My results indicate that the European 
donors allocate their Aid for Trade according to individual preferences. 
Most of the European donors do not seem to be motivated by the need of 
the recipient but rather by self-interest, such as colonial past. The European 
donors also seem to be motivated differently by the merits of the recipients. 
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In 2013, 767 million people around the world lived in extreme poverty.1 
Development aid has been used for decades with the aim to lift people out of 
poverty, but the benefits of aid have been heavily investigated and 
questioned. Trade could be another factor to lift more people out of poverty, 
and several trade policy initiatives exist to foster economic growth. One such 
initiative is Aid for Trade. The European Union (EU) and its member states 
represents more than one third of the total amount of Aid for Trade, making 
the union one of the biggest and most important donors in the world. Aid for 
Trade is expressed as one of the key pillars of the EU development policies 
and the Joint EU Aid for Trade strategy has the overreaching objective to 
eradicate poverty. Despite the EU being one of the biggest Aid for Trade 
donor, its activity has not been thoroughly investigated. The aim of this thesis 
is to investigate if the European donors respond to factors in recipient 
countries that make aid more effective in reducing poverty, such as the 
poverty level and the quality of institutions within a recipient country. Or if 
the Aid for Trade allocation mainly is motivated by strategic and political 
motives? Specifically, I will investigate whether the recipients’ development 
needs, merit or self-interest of the donor play a role in the allocation process. 
 
1.1 Problem statement 
Aid for Trade has received increased attention among development 
organizations and policymakers as a tool to promote economic growth, 
integrate developing countries into the world economy and reduce poverty. 
It has been widely recognized that market access for developing countries is 
not enough to induce economic growth and lifting its people out of poverty. 
Aid directed at lowering trade costs, many of them found inside the countries, 
are needed for the countries to enjoy the economic advantages of trade and 
to be a part of the global economy. Since the launch of the initiative in 2005, 
the World Bank and the Organization of Economic Cooperation and 
Development (OECD) have published Global Reviews of Aid for Trade 
showing positive results and success stories. Additionally, Aid for Trade has 
                                                     
1 Introduction to understanding poverty at the World Bank http://www.worldbank.org/en/under-
standing-poverty  
1 Introduction 
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been recognized as an important mean by the Sustainable Development 
Goals to accomplish inclusive economic growth and reduce poverty within 
developing countries.2  
EU and its member states are the biggest donors of Aid for Trade in the 
world, and one of its biggest advocates, but neither Aid for Trade nor the 
allocation of the European donors, have been subject for much earlier 
research. On the contrary, development aid has been heavily targeted by 
researchers. Poor institutional quality, poor development, the approach of the 
western donors and corruption have been cited as common reason to why 
several observers argue that aid flows are wasted and are not reducing 
poverty (Sachs, 2005; Easterly, 2006; Collier, 2007; Moyo, 2009). At the 
same time, there is growing evidence that donors may use their bilateral 
development aid to pursue national interest (Berthélemy, 2006a; Hoeffler 
and Outram, 2011; Alesina and Dollar, 2000) and not respond to factors 
making development aid effective. Donors have been found to behave in an 
egoistic way and direct their assistance to their most significant trading 
partners (Berthélemy, 2006a). Political and strategic motives have also been 
found to outweigh the development needs of a recipient (Alesina and Dollar, 
2000).  
Different donors also claim to have different strategies with their foreign 
assistance and development aid. The actual motives of the donors have been 
heavily discussed and have focused on altruistic behaviors (focusing on need 
and merit of the recipient) or egoistic behavior (donor self-interest). The 
European Union and its member states claims the aim of their foreign 
assistance to be altruistic with the overreaching goal to eradicate poverty 
(EU, 2006; EU, 2007) and to prioritize least-developed countries. Other 
donors have their own purpose with rationales for foreign assistance. Japan 
and the US are among the biggest donor of development aid and Aid for 
Trade in the world but differs in their motives. The US clearly claims that the 
objectives of its foreign assistance is national security, commercial interest 
and humanitarian concerns (Lawson and Tarnoff, 2018).  The objectives of 
Japans foreign assistance claims to be altruistic and like the Europeans the 
country want to promote universal values and to ensure world peace, stability 
and prosperity (Ministry of Foreign Affairs Japan, 1992).   
 
                                                     
2 Further reading about Sustainable Development Goal 8 “Decent Work and Economic Growth” 
http://www.undp.org/content/undp/en/home/sustainable-development-goals/goal-8-decent-work-and-
economic-growth.html  
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1.2 Aim of the study 
With this thesis, I will address the gap in research regarding Aid for Trade 
and how the European donors allocates their Aid for Trade. The potential of 
Aid for Trade to eradicate poverty has been highly praised both among 
governments and organizations but if the donors allocates their Aid for Trade 
out of self-interest (and not development needs or institutional quality) it 
could potentially undermine the efficiency. I will also compare the European 
donors’ allocation with two of the largest Aid for Trade donors: Japan and 
the U.S. The methodology will build on the paper by Hoeffler and Outram 
(2011) but applied on Aid for Trade data and on the donors: the EU 
Institutions, Germany, France, UK, Sweden, Japan and the US. The choice 
of explanatory variables will also be adjusted to fit Aid for Trade flows and 
not general aid flows. 
The research question is: 
• How are the European Aid for Trade flows allocated? Specifically, 
if the needs of the recipient, merit of the recipient or the self- 
interest of the donor are motivations in the allocation process? 
With the objectives: 
• To investigate how Germany, France, UK, Sweden and the EU 
Institutions allocate their Aid for Trade flows, and if the allocation 
is motivated by the needs and merit of the recipient or self-interest 
of the donor.  
• To compare how Germany, France, UK, Sweden and the EU 
Institutions allocate their Aid for Trade flows. 
• To investigate how the European donors’ allocation compares to 
the biggest donors outside Europe: The US and Japan 
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2.1 Aid for trade – What is it? 
Trade has been identified in various empirical literature to be an engine 
for long run economic growth and to reduce poverty (e.g., Grossman and 
Helpman, 1990; Romer, 1990). Developing countries may therefore have 
much to gain by increased trade and trade openness. Over the last decades 
the world has seen a substantial increase in international trade with trade 
agreements, lower tariffs and lower trade barriers. The increasing 
participation of developing countries in the world economy raised concerns 
that the developing countries cannot harness the economic opportunities 
given to them. Increased aid has been argued as vital to do the big investment 
in infrastructure and product capacity necessary to overcome the supply side 
constraints and high adjustment cost the developing countries are facing 
(Stiglizt and Charlton, 2006; Rodrik, 2001). The countries may lack the 
necessary knowledge and technology to meet the product standard in exports 
market such as certification and sanitary measures, or lack the exporting 
infrastructure such as communication, efficient ports and decent roads. The 
institutions within countries could also be inefficient resulting in high 
administrative costs, such as custom clearing time, inefficient policies or 
corruption. (Hoekman and Nicita, 2011) 
Against this background, the Aid for Trade initiative was launched in 
2005 at the World Trade Organization (WTO) Hong Kong Ministerial 
Conference. At the meeting the countries agreed to help developing countries 
build the capacity they needed to take advantage of trade opportunities. The 
Aid for Trade initiative was taken in consensus among the WTO members 
and meant a significant change in the importance of trade-related 
development assistance within development and trade policies (Page, 2007). 
A new consensus emerged which accepted that trade policies focusing only 
on trade openness are not enough for developing countries to benefit from 
market opportunities, achieve economic growth and reduce poverty. In fact, 
many developing countries have been unable to use trade as an engine for 
growth because they are facing difficulties in trading due to supply side 
constraints and trade-related obstacles. The idea to lower trade costs and 
trade obstacles for developing countries, so they can enjoy the economic 
advantages of increased trade, is not new. It has been pursued by aid donors 
and developing country governments for many years. But for the first time at 
the Ministerial Conference in Hong Kong in 2005, both the development and 
international trade communities acknowledged that the matters concerned 
them both (Hoekman, 2010). 
 
2 Background 
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2.1.1 Definition and evolution of Aid for Trade 
The Director General of the WTO announced the composition of an Aid 
for Trade Taskforce in February 2006. The objectives of the taskforce were 
to investigate the needs of the developing countries and to operationalize the 
initiative. In July 2006, the Trade Task Force proposed, together with 
highlighting the importance of trade in poverty reduction, six categories to 
measure Aid for Trade: 
 
Table 1. The six categories proposed by the Aid for Trade Taskforce. 
Category Definition 
Trade-related infrastructure Physical infrastructure with the aim to connect domestic and 
foreign markets. For example, roads, communication, ports. 
Building productive capacity Aid to make countries be able to diversify production and exports.  
Trade-related adjustment costs Aid to help the countries with the adjustment cost. For example, 
tariff reductions or trade policy set out by other countries 
Trade development Aid to support development within trade sectors. For example, 
investment promotion, market analysis and development. 
Trade policy and regulations Aid to comply with rules and product standard but also to analyse 
the effect of trade proposals and positions. For example, aid 
directed towards facilitate implementation of trade agreements 
and comply with rules and product standards and training of trade 
officials. 
Other trade-related  Other trade related support not captured by the categories above 
Source: WTO, 2006 
Since the launch of Aid for Trade, the initiative has gained an increased 
interest both among trade and development policy makers. In 2007, only two 
years after the launch of the initiative, the first WTO/OECD review showed 
that Aid for Trade is of growing importance in the donors’ development 
programmes (OECD and WTO, 2007). In 2011, the WTO and OECD 
published its third monitoring reports where focus was to evaluate the 
initiative since its start in 2006. The report indicated positive tangible results 
and that the initiative has achieved considerable progress in short time 
(OECD and WTO, 2011).  
Both countries and donor agencies are more and more prioritizing Aid for 
Trade in their development strategies, which can be seen in the average 
annual growth rate of commitments by 16% and disbursement by 11-12% 
between 2006-2011.3  Disbursements are the actual payment each year from 
                                                     
3 Aid for trade showing results http://www.oecd.org/dac/Aid for Trade/Policy_brief_Aid for 
Trade_Showing_Results.pdf  
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the donor to the recipient country, while commitments represent an 
obligation undertaken by the donor. The commitment consists of monetary 
assistance to a recipient country and are often disbursement spread over 
several years. In 2011, the commitments were 57% above the commitment 
baseline from 2002-2005. The Aid for Trade disbursement flows increased 
from 18,140 million USD in 2005 to 39,421 million USD dollar in 2015, 
which is equivalent to an average annual growth rate of around 12%.  
Asia and Africa have received the largest share of Aid for Trade followed 
by the Americas, Europe and last Oceania (see Figure 1). The Aid for Trade 
flows to Africa experienced a rapid growth and almost three doubled between 
2005 and 2015 but stalled during the last years. Aid for Trade to emerging 
European countries declined between 2011 and 2015, while other regions 
remained relatively stable. Between 2005-2015, 38% of the Aid for Trade 
flows was disbursed to Asia and 35% was disbursed to Africa (OECD, 2015). 
The dominating Aid for Trade flows are aimed at projects in economic 
infrastructure (47%) and building productive capacity (52%). The four 
biggest sectors in receiving Aid for Trade financed projects have been 
transport and storage (29%), energy generation and supply (21%), agriculture 
(18%) and banking (10%). The four sectors are closely related to cutting 
trade costs and up to 2015 more than 75% of total Aid for Trade had gone to 
projects within these sectors. The potential and importance of trade and Aid 
for Trade to reduce poverty is gaining more attention and flows are 
increasing. Partner countries and donors are prioritizing trade in their 
development strategies where the share of Aid for Trade in sector allocable 
aid rose from 31% to 38 % between 2006-2013 (OECD, 2015). Studies made 
by OECD predicts that 1% in global trade costs could increase global income 
by a minimum of 40 USD billion, where 63% would be generated by 
developing countries. 
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Figure 1. Total Aid for Trade disbursement flows per region between 2005-2015
 
Source: Authors’ calculation based on OECD DAC Database. 
2.2 European Aid for Trade 
The EU presented in 2007 its own Aid for Trade strategy. The Joint EU 
Aid for Trade strategy strives to increase the total amount of Aid for Trade 
and do it in coherence with other development goals, such as the gradual 
increase in overall development aid, to make sure that an increase in Aid for 
Trade are not achieved at the expense of other priorities. The EU strategy on 
Aid for Trade is focused on the needs of the recipients and has the aim to: 
“[..] support all developing countries, particularly Least Developed 
Countries (LDCs), to better integrate into the rules-based world trading 
system and to more effectively use trade in promoting the overarching 
objective of eradication of poverty in the context of sustainable development” 
(EU, 2007)  
The strategy is based on external documents (Paris Declaration on Aid 
Effectiveness, WTO-Doha agenda, the Millennium Development Goals) and 
the EU Code of Conduct on complementarity and division of labour in 
development policy.  In the strategy, the EU states that Aid for Trade is an 
important complement to trade negotiations and is crucial for developing 
countries to successfully implement trade agreements and enjoy the 
economic benefits coming from trade. The strategy is a guide to how the EU 
and its member states should use their Aid for Trade, based on voluntarily 
and flexible basis and on the recommendation from the WTO 2006 Task 
Force. Although no special commitments were made in 2007, other than EU 
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collectively pledge to strive to increase its expenditure on trade policy and 
regulations and trade development, OECD numbers shows that EU was also 
a major donor in the other categories of Aid for Trade. The strategy of 2007 
is composed of five pillars: 
1. Collectively increasing the volume of European Aid for Trade. EU 
institution and member states commits to collectively spend €2 billion 
annually on Trade-Related Assistance. 
2. Enhancing the quality and the pro-poor focus of European Aid for 
Trade; 
3. Increase the capacity of European Aid for Trade to be in line with 
globally agreed effective aid principles; 
4. To have an African, Caribbean and the Pacific-specific angle (APEC) 
of the European Aid for Trade strategy. 
5. To monitor and report Aid for Trade effectively. Under this pillar, the 
EU publishes annual Aid for Trade Monitoring Reports where the EU 
reports on the Aid for Trade progress.  
The EU and its member states have collectively been the largest donor of 
Aid for Trade since the launch of the initiative, representing 39% of all the 
Aid for Trade disbursement between 2005-2015, while 61% have been from 
other countries and agencies. More than 70% of the European Aid for Trade 
have been provided by the EU institutions, Germany and France. The 
evolution of the European Aid for Trade is presented in Figure 2. From 2005 
to 2015 the Aid for Trade flows increased with an annual of 22%. Africa has 
been the biggest recipient of European Aid for Trade with almost 36% of the 
amount committed in 2010 and 55% in 2013. Other important recipients of 
European Aid for Trade are Asia and the EU.  
 
Figure 2. Total European Aid for Trade disbursement flows between 2005-2015 
 
Source: Authors’ calculation based on OECD DAC Database. 
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The motivations behind the allocation of development aid have been 
thoroughly examined during the last decades. Many studies have been 
motivated by the question if the main motives have been development or 
other motives, such as self-interest (e.g., Alesina and Dollar, 2000; Hoeffler 
and Outram, 2011; Collier and Dollar, 2001a, b). The increased attention to 
aid effectiveness has resulted in much research regarding development aid 
flows, but because of Aid for Trade is relatively new it has not been subject 
for much research. In theory, the linkage between increased trade and 
development is straightforward: trade facilitation leads to an expansion of 
trade, investment and production opportunities which in turn leads to income 
growth, and hence development (Helble et al., 2012). Trade facilitation 
initiatives, such as Aid for Trade, can be directed at lowering trade costs 
leading to an expansion of trade flows and an increase in trade 
competitiveness. In reality, the linkage between trade facilitation and 
development is more complex and difficult. Initiatives directed at trade 
facilitation and lowering trade costs meet other challenges such as the 
national contexts, political and economic structures in the recipient country, 
private sector priorities, development agendas and national interests.  
 
3.1 Previous research: How does Aid for Trade 
work? 
The Aid for Trade initiative was launched in 2005 and has not been as 
targeted by research as development aid.  The research that exist has found 
Aid for Trade initiatives, aimed at reducing trade cost, to correlate to an 
increased trade performance. It has been suggested that 1% in Aid for Trade 
facilitation correlates to an increase in export worth of USD 290 million for 
the recipient countries (Helbe et al., 2012) and that Aid for Trade also has a 
positive effect on the trade performance of the donor (Hühne et al., 2014). 
Other initiatives directed at lowering trade costs have shown evidence to 
have a positive impact on trade and growth, where different trade facilitation 
measures work through different channels. The importance of infrastructure 
and transportation cost in explaining trade and access to markets have been 
highlighted by various researchers. Clark et al. (2004) investigated the 
importance of infrastructure and transportation cost to the US market for 
Latin American countries and found that improving port efficiency from the 
25th to the 75th percentile resulted in a reduction in shipping cost by 12%. 
3 Literature review and theoretical 
framework 
10 
 
Sea port efficiency included activities related to custom requirements, cargo 
handling, port infrastructure etc. The infrastructure was further highlighted 
by the findings that having bad ports was equivalent to being 60% further 
away from export markets. Shepherd and Wilson (2006) showed that road 
quality has a big effect on regional trade flows. They used a gravity model 
simulation applied on 138 cities in 27 countries across Central Asia and 
Europe and found that ambitious road update program could boost intra-
regional trade up to 50%. Their research also indicated positive intra-regional 
spill over effects on trade from improving road quality in countries which are 
important transit corridors. Product standards and technical regulations, set 
out by developed countries, have also been suggested as important factors 
driving trade costs, especially for developing countries.  Chen et al. (2006) 
quantified the impact of technical regulations and standards and found that 
difficulties in accessing information lead to a discourage among exporters by 
18%. Firms affected by testing procedures were shown to have between 9-
16% smaller export share.  Communication has also been stated as an 
important determinant of trade costs and trade facilitation aimed reducing 
communication cost has been shown to have a significant influence on trade 
patterns (Fink et al., 2005).  
 
3.2 Previous research: Aid allocation theory 
3.2.1 Aid – need, merit and effectiveness 
Various factors and variables influence aid, and development aid is as 
much as a matter of knowledge as it is about money. The correlation and 
effectiveness between aid and poverty reduction is complex and it is difficult 
to establish causation due to many things coincide and correlates. The World 
Bank concluded that what really makes a difference is if the development aid 
is given to a country that pursue effective policies and have development 
needs (World Bank, 1998). On the other side of the debate, research is also 
suggesting that there is little evidence that aid is working at all (Easterly, 
2006).  But still, researchers have been motivated to investigate the 
effectiveness and motives of aid, and many researchers have looked at 
recipients need, merits and the self-interest when investigating them (e.g. 
Alesina and Dollar, 2000; Hoeffler and Outram, 2011; Collier and Dollar, 
2001a, b). 
Research suggest that if development aid is efficiently allocated the 
productivity of the current aid could be greatly improved (Collier and Dollar, 
2001b). Collier and Dollar (2001b) argues that aid is allocated inefficiently 
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and targeted to countries which have weak policies and do not have severe 
poverty problems. They argue that the effectiveness of aid depends on the 
recipients’ poverty level and the quality of its policies, and that effectiveness 
of aid could be greatly improved if aid is allocated to poor countries with 
development friendly economic policies.  They derived a formula for 
poverty-efficient allocation of aid and compered it to the actual aid allocation 
among donors which resulted in the conclusion.  
When looking at recipients’ merits, aid has been found to be more 
effective when given to developing countries with sound institutions, good 
economic policies and good trade policies (Burnside and Dollar, 2000; 
Collier and Dollar, 2001a). If the recipient country has poor polices 
(measured by the Freedom House Democracy index), foreign aid has little 
effect on growth in GDP per capita. Burnside and Dollar (2000) used a 
database on foreign aid developed by the World Bank, a panel of 56 countries 
between the years 1970-73 to 1990-93 and introduced an aid-policy 
interaction term in the growth regression. When they revisited their results in 
2004 they found even stronger evidence that institutional quality effects the 
relationship between aid and growth (Burnside and Dollar, 2004). 
There is mixed evidence that the donors are rewarding economic, political 
and social performance. Nunnenkamp and Thiele (2006) found that few 
donors preferred recipients that offered promising condition for aid to be 
effective. Additionally, none of the major donors responded to change in 
policy quality in the recipient countries. They used aggregated aid data from 
all the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) countries, nine big donors 
and applied it on a Tobit model. The variables measurement of the 
governmental merits where measured by the Worldwide Governance 
Indicators (WGI). Hoeffler and Outram (2011) also found that the allocation 
decision of the donor correlates poorly to the merits. They analysed aid flows 
from 22 donors between 1980-2004, used data from the Polity IV dataset, 
GDP per capita, UN voting patterns and found similar results. However, 
economic and social performance have been found in some papers to be 
rewarded by donors (e.g., Berthélemy and Tichit, 2004; Gates and Hoeffler, 
2004).  
3.2.2 Donors self-interest 
Previous studies have found strong indications that foreign assistance is 
allocated according to the donors’ self-interest. The research up to date has 
found that the interest of the donor has been outweighing the needs of the 
recipient, even if the development needs and merits of the recipient has been 
suggested to be important in terms of efficiency and effectiveness. One of 
the most influential paper in the aid allocation debate is Alesina and Dollar 
12 
 
(2000) and their findings that donors cares more about economic, political 
and strategical factors than the development need of the recipients. Their 
findings suggest that colonial past and political alliances are mayor 
determinants of aid allocation and explain more of the allocation of aid than 
the political institutions or economic policies of the recipient. They used data 
on bilateral aid flows from the DAC countries between 1970-1994 and 
included variables such as trade openness, democracy, colonial status and 
civil liberties. The findings have been shown to be robust (Berthélemy and 
Tichit, 2004; Berthélemy, 2006; Hoeffler and Outram, 2011) and there is 
evidence that donors’ self-interest is an important driver of the aid allocation. 
For example, Berthélemy (2006b) results suggest that donors behave in an 
egoistic way and target their aid to their most significant trade partners. He 
also finds difference among donors’ behaviour; one example is the Nordic 
countries being more altruistic in their allocation decision. Berthélemy and 
Tichit (2004) finds that good economic policies have been rewarded but also 
that trade partners get favoured. The results suggested by Hoffler and Outram 
(2011) also shows that donors provide more aid to their trade partners and 
some donors provided more aid to countries who vote alongside them at the 
U.N. 
13 
 
The motives of development aid have been heavily targeted by earlier 
research. GDP per capita has been commonly used as a proxy for the 
recipient poverty levels and needs (e.g., Hoeffler and Outram 2011; Alesina 
and Dollar 2000), and the governmental merits have been proxied by both 
the Freedom House Democracy Index (e.g. Burnside and Dollar, 2000; 
Collier and Dollar, 2001a,b; Hoeffler and Outram, 2011) and the Worldwide 
Governance Index (e.g., Nunnenkamp and Thiele, 2006). When looking at 
the donors’ self-interest both colonial past, UN voting pattern and export 
have been used (e.g., Alseina and Dollar, 2000; Hoeffler and Outram 2011; 
Berthélemy and Tichit, 2004). This thesis will follow the methodology set 
out in Hoeffler and Outram (2011) but applied on Aid for Trade data and 
using the Worldwide Governmental Index as proxies for governmental 
merits. 
4.1 Data 
4.1.1 Dependent variable 
The Aid for Trade variable is obtained from the online OECD database on 
Aid for Trade statistics: QWIDS. The database is based on the aid flows 
reported to the Credit Reporting System (CRS) and covers around 90% of all 
the Official Development Assistance (ODA) directed towards developing 
countries. The QWIDS database are extracted from 12 categories in the CRS 
data system and have proxied the Aid for Trade flows under the following 
five categories: 
• Technical assistance for trade policy and regulations 
• Economic infrastructure 
• Productive capacity building 
• Trade-related adjustment 
• Other trade-related needs 
The CRS database cannot provide data that exactly match the categories 
proposed by the WTO Aid for Trade Task Force recommendations in 2005 
but have been recognized as being the best existing data source for Aid for 
Trade flows.4 The CRS database consist of comparable data over time and 
countries, including ODA loans and grants with both commitments and 
                                                     
4 At the Review of the Monterrey Consensus on Fincancial and Development in 2008 the CRS 
database was recognized as being the best data source for tracking Aid for Trade flows. 
http://www.un.org/esa/ffd/doha/chapter3/OECD_submission.pdf 
4 Methodology and data 
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disbursement. In the QWIDS data base the Aid for Trade flows are converted 
into constant USD 2015.  
There is no consensus in the literature on whether to use disbursement or 
commitment data when looking at the strategic decision of the donor. 
Berthélemy and Tichit (2004) use commitment data as it would better reflect 
donors’ motives, other studies use disbursement data (Nunnenkamp and 
Thiele, 2006) motivated by that the decision to implement aid reflects an 
important process. This thesis will use disbursement data as the dependent 
variable because it measures the amount of Aid for Trade being transferred 
from the donor to the recipient a specific year, and hence the actual transfer.  
A panel data set is constructed with the five biggest European donors: EU 
Institutions, Germany, France, UK and Sweden and their Aid for Trade flows 
between 2005-2015 using yearly disbursement data. Data from the US and 
Japan will also be extracted from the source and included in the panel data to 
be able to compare the allocation decision of the European donors to other 
big Aid for Trade donors. The data reported to the CRS system, and hence 
showed in the QWIDS database, could be of negative figures and would 
relate to when repayment from a recipient country on loans were larger than 
the ODA received that year.  
4.1.2 Explanatory variables 
The explanatory variables will be categorized into three groups: 
• Recipients need. The variable will help to analyse if donors 
allocate more or less aid to poorer countries. The coefficient 
should be negative if donors are prioritizing to allocate their Aid 
for Trade to poorer countries with higher needs. 
• Recipients merits. The variables will help to analyse if donors 
allocate more or less aid to countries with better policies and 
merits. The coefficients should be positive if donors reward good 
governance among the recipient countries.   
• The donor self-interest. The variable will help to analyse if donor 
allocates more or less aid to countries where they have national 
interest.  If donors are prioritizing to allocate their Aid for Trade 
to countries where they have interest, the coefficient will be 
positive. 
The recipients’ income per capita is commonly used in aid allocation 
literature to demonstrate the recipient needs, but average income does not 
work well to measure the need of the recipient if the distribution is highly 
skewed. Therefore, I will use the Poverty headcount ratio at USD 1.90 a day 
obtained from the World Bank database. The indicator shows the proportion 
of people below the poverty line USD 1.90 a day (extreme poverty) and is 
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adjusted to 2011 Purchasing Power Parity dollars.  The variable measures the 
percent of people in a country living in poverty and is a better measurement 
to capture how poor a country is.  There are missing observations for some 
of the recipient countries, which was not surprising due to the availability of 
poverty data is suffering from large gaps where almost half of the countries 
are deprived of adequate data on poverty.5 Therefore, I adjusted for the 
missing observation on the Poverty headcount ratio by applying the average 
growth rate for the individual countries during the years of missing 
observation. For recipients with no poverty data between 2005-2015 at all, 
the observation is reported as missing during the whole period.  
Good policies have been suggested in earlier research to be an important 
factor for the success and effectiveness of development aid (Burnside and 
Dollar, 2000). To represent the donor’s merit, I will therefore use the World 
Bank Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI) together with the growth of 
GDP per capita. The variable growth of GDP per capita will be representing 
good economic policies and is extracted from the World Development 
Indicators by the World Bank. The variable is based on local currency and 
converted on an aggregated level to constant USD 2010. The WGI will 
represent good governance and captures six areas of governance: Voice and 
accountability, Political Stability and Lack of Violence, Government 
Effectiveness, Regulatory Quality, Rule of Law and Control for Corruption. 
The variable measuring Voice and Accountability will be proxied as the level 
of democracy in the recipient country. The WGI indicators captures broad 
dimensions of governance and are the result of a long going project to 
develop cross-country variables for Good Governance. The data set is based 
on around 30 different data sources such as surveys of firms and household, 
non-governmental organizations, public sector organizations, commercial 
information providers, and includes 340 different variables. The WGI 
indicators range from -2.5 to 2.5 and have been used widely for research 
purposes.  
I will also add a variable describing how open a country is for trade: Trade 
openness. The variable will be obtained from the World Development 
Indicator database and is calculated by dividing the value of the export and 
import with the recipients GDP. The variable is relevant because the purpose 
with Aid for Trade is to integrate developing countries into the international 
economy. I will lag the merit variables with one year to overcome the 
endogeneity issue because of potential reverse causality.  
The variables representing the donors’ self-interest will be measured in 
the donors’ export to recipient and the colonial past. Colonial past has been 
found in earlier research to be a major motive of the allocation of bilateral 
                                                     
5From the World Bank blog:  http://blogs.worldbank.org/developmenttalk/much-world-de-
prived-poverty-data-let-s-fix 
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aid (Alesina and Dollar, 2000) and I create dummy variables describing if the 
recipient has been a colony of France, UK or Germany during the 20th 
century. The export data come from the UN Comtrade database which 
contains only trade in products and will be a proxy for commercial interest. 
To overcome the reverse causality of aid and trade, I lag the trade variable 
with one year.  
Some of the recipient had to be excluded from the dataset due to 
insufficient data on the different explanatory variables. For example, this 
included some countries which during the period were suffering from internal 
conflicts and war: Libya, Syria and Somalia. Kosovo, Sudan and South 
Sudan were also excluded due to South Sudan gained their independence in 
2011 from Sudan and Kosovo for its independence in 2008. Additionally, 
Special Administrative Regions such as Macau (China) and Overseas 
Collectively French Polynesia were excluded, as well as small island states 
such as Niue, Saint Helena and Wallis and Futuna. The countries received 
little or no Aid for Trade from the donors and had missing observations in 
several of the explanatory variables.  
4.1.3 Control variables 
With the respect to control variables, I follow Hoeffler and Outram (2011) 
and control for population. Additionally, I add a dummy variable if a 
recipient is landlocked according to the UNCTAD list of landlocked 
developing countries due to the higher cost of trading. Landlocked countries 
could potentially lead to donors trying to compensate for the higher cost and 
allocate more Aid for Trade (Tadasse and Fayissa, 2009). Belarus and Serbia 
are added additionally since they we’re not on the UN list of landlocked 
countries. Last, I will also control for if the recipient is a member of the 
European Generalized Schemes of Preference (GSP) and in the APEC trade 
agreement by adding dummy variables. The GSP program grants better 
access to European market for certain developing countries and the APEC 
region has a special focus in the European Aid for Trade strategy.  The 
dummy variables will take the value of 1 of the recipient countries are 
landlocked, member of the GSP or in the APEC and zero otherwise.  
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Table 1. Overview and description of explanatory variables and control variables. 
 
Variable Description Mean Min Max 
Standard 
deviation 
Need      
Poverty at $1.90 a day Percentage of population living under $1.90 a day 18.98 0 78.5 21.89 
Merit      
Growth of GDP per capita Annual GDP growth in % 2.86 -36.83 34.79 4.756 
Government Effectiveness 
Measures the quality of public services and its independence from 
political pressure. Between -2.5 to 2.5. 
-0.41 -2.04 1.57 0.696 
Voice and Accountability 
Measures freedom of expression, association and to which extent 
citizen can select their government. Between -2.5 to 2.5 
-0.29 -2.26 1.29 .849 
Political Stability and Absence of 
Violence/Terrorism 
Measures political instability and the likelihood of political motivated 
violence and terrorism. Between -2.5 to 2.5 
-0.30 -2.83 1.45 0.903 
Regulatory Quality 
Measures the ability of the government to formulate and implement 
policies and regulation that permit and promote private sector 
development. Between -2.5 to 2.5 
-0.403 -2.27 1.54 0.714 
Rule of Law 
Measures the extent to which agents have confidence in and abide by 
the rules of society. Between -2.5 to 2.5 
-0.415 -2.03 1.43 0.711 
Control of Corruption 
Measures the perception to which extent power is exercised for private 
gain. Between -2.5 to 2.5 
-0.401 -1.77 1.72 0.68 
Trade openness 
Trade as a % of GDP.  
(Value of export + import)/GDP 
83.94 0 311.36 37.29 
Self-interest      
Export (USD millions) Export donor to recipient 2085.3 0 240247 10584.39 
Former colony France 
Dummy variables which takes value 1 if recipient being a colony to 
France during the 20th century 
0.162 0 1 - 
Former colony UK 
Dummy variables which takes value 1 if recipient being a colony to UK 
during the 20th century 
0.317 0 1 - 
Former colony Germany 
Dummy variables which takes value 1 if recipient being a colony to 
Germany during the 20th century 
0.148 0 1 - 
Control variables      
Population (millions) Population within the recipient country 39.56 0.01 1371.22 153.785   
Landlocked 
Dummy variable which takes value 1 if recipient begin on the 
UNCTAD list of landlocked countries 
0.232 0 1 - 
GSP Signatory 
Dummy variable which takes value 1 if recipient being signatory of 
GSP 
0.549 0 1 - 
GSP+ Signatory 
Dummy variable which takes value 1 if recipient being signatory of 
GSP+ 
0.211 0 1 - 
APEC member 
Dummy variable which takes value 1 if recipient being member of 
APEC 
0.077 0 1 - 
 
4.2 Econometric Model 
I use the most common estimation model in the aid allocation literature 
(Alesina and Dollar, 2000; Hoeffler and Outram, 2011) and calculate 
separate equations for each donor using a pooled OLS regression: 
 
Aidijt = α + βiXijt + uijt 
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where the t represents time, i represent the donor, j represents the recipient 
and Aid represent the Aid for Trade disbursement from a donor to a recipient. 
Furthermore, the X denotes a vector of explanatory variables (recipient needs, 
recipients merit and donors’ self-interest), α is a constant and uijt is an error 
term. The equation above may be biased due to the panel data structure. For 
instance, an error term may correlate within a country or a year. One way to 
address this issue is to use clustered standard errors in the OLS regression or 
to use a country fixed effects model or random fixed effect model.  
The random effects model can use time-invariant information and provide 
more efficient estimates. However, these may be biased. The fixed effects 
model controls for all – observed and unobserved – time-invariant factors. 
The country fixed effects model addresses the correlations within a country 
and allows for identification of the causal relationship and exploit the within 
observations by subtracting the country mean from the variables (first 
differences). In the random fixed effects model the country-specific effects 
are treated as uncorrelated with the explanatory variables and treated as 
random. To decide if random effects or fixed effects should be applied, a 
Hausman test (1978) can be used. If the Hausman test does not reject the null 
hypothesis, the more efficient random effects model is preferred. Under the 
alternate hypothesis, the fixed effects model provides consistent estimates.  
The empirical analysis has three stages:  
1. Look at the aggregate data and the donors one-by-one to see if need, 
merit and self-interest motivates the European donors in their Aid for 
Trade allocation.  
2. Compare the European donors with each other to see if they differ in 
their allocation by only using the recipient-year observations the 
donors have in common (a method proposed by Hoeffler and Outram 
(2011) to overcome the comparability issue following comparing 
donors using different samples). 
3. Thirdly, I will compare the European donors to the U.S and Japan. I 
will restrict the sample to only common observations. 
 
4.3 Summary statistics 
Africa is by far the poorest region in the sample with an average of 38% 
of its population living on less than USD 1.90 a day (see Appendix 1). The 
region has a high standard deviation due to countries like Burundi, Demo. 
Rep. of Congo, Madagascar and Malawi having a poverty rate over 70% 
during the period, and other countries such as Algeria, Mauritius, Morocco 
and Seychelles having poverty rates under 4%. Oceania, Asia and the 
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Americas all score around the same poverty rates, 7-13%, and have high 
standard deviation due to the poverty rates within the regions also have big 
variations ranging from 0%-56% in Asia, 0%-37% in the Americas and 0.6-
38% in Oceania. The region with the least poverty rate in our sample are the 
Middle East and Europe where the poverty rate for both regions is around 
2%, which is a result of Georgian and Macedonian poverty rates (as high as 
19% for Georgia) which drive up the poverty rates for Europe, while poverty 
data from the Middle East is missing for Oman and Saudi Arabia.  
Africa, Asia and the Middle East are the regions where we find recipients 
with the lowest governmental qualities measured by the WGI (see Appendix 
1). The Middle East stand out as the recipient region with the highest rate of 
political instability, where Iraq and Yemen scores lower than -2, and the 
lowest scores on the proxy for democracy (Voice and Accountability), where 
Saudi Arabia has the lowest rate (as low as -1.9). Africa is the recipient region 
with the lowest governmental qualities regarding rule of law and government 
effectiveness. Asia is the region with most corruption, and the region has 
lower scores on democracy and a higher level of political instability than to 
Africa. Countries such as Afghanistan and Pakistan are countries with high 
levels of political instability, with scores around -2.5, while Myanmar and 
Turkmenistan are countries with scores as low as -2.2 on democracy. Asia is 
also the recipient region with the highest rate of fast growing economies 
where countries like China, Myanmar and Turkmenistan have high growth 
rates around 10-12% during the period, while the Middle East has the lowest 
rate of economic growth. Europe, followed by Oceania, are the regions most 
open to trade. Based on the indicators, the regions with the most need is 
Africa, Asia and Oceania, and should be prioritized over Europe and the 
Americas. Europe and the Americas are the regions with the lowest poverty 
rates and the best quality of governance 
All donor countries, except the US, export most of their goods to 
recipients in Asia (see Appendix 2). In the case of the US, the country export 
most of its goods to the Americas region where most of the export between 
2005-2015 goes to Mexico and Brazil.  
Both Germany and UK allocate most Aid for Trade to countries in the 
Asia while the EU Institutions and Sweden allocate most Aid for Trade to 
countries in Europe. France is the only donor country with most of its Aid 
for Trade allocated to recipients in Africa. Oceania is the region which 
receives the least Aid for Trade and export from the donor countries, except 
Japan. This is probably due to Oceania being mostly made up by small island 
states, and very close to Japan in comparison to other donors, and hence not 
being prioritized by other donors. The US Aid for Trade is highly 
concentrated to the Middle East region, where most of the aid during the 
period is allocated to Iraq.  
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The summary statistics gives an indication that the Aid for Trade flows 
may not be allocated according to the recipient needs since all donors, except 
France, give most Aid for Trade to other regions than Africa. Germany, UK 
and Japan also direct more Aid for Trade to the recipients in the region where 
most of their export are directed. The results of the summary statistics 
motivate further the aim of the thesis.  
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5.1 European donors 
5.1.1 All observations donor-by-donor 
Several OLS regressions with clustered standard errors at country level 
are estimated on the European donors and presented in estimations (1)-(5) in 
Table 2. The results indicate that the individual European donors are 
motivated differently by needs, merits and self-interest when allocating their 
Aid for Trade. The variable “Governmental Effectiveness” was excluded due 
to high VIF-values6 indicating multicollinearity and strong correlations 
between the variables measuring the rule of law and the government 
effectiveness.  
The poverty level in the recipient country does not seem to be a motivation 
for most of the European donor, where the EU Institutions and the UK are 
the only donors giving more Aid for Trade to poorer countries. Two of the 
five pillars in the European Aid for Trade strategy is to enhance the pro-poor 
focus and to have an APEC specific angle but not all the European donors 
seems to allocate more aid to poorer countries, neither to allocate more to 
APEC-members. In fact, the EU Institutions, Germany and Sweden seem to 
allocate less to a recipient being a member of APEC. 
The results indicate that the European donors are motivated differently by 
the governmental qualities and merits of the recipients, and generally not 
motivated by the governmental qualities measured by the WGI. The UK 
allocates less Aid for Trade to recipients with higher political stability while 
Sweden allocates more aid to recipients with higher political stability. 
Regulatory quality is rewarded by the EU Institutions and Germany. France 
is not motivated at all by the level of the governmental qualities or merits in 
its allocation of Aid for Trade. The coefficients of the level of democracy are 
statistically not significant for all European donors. The other merit variables, 
measuring trade openness and economic growth, also differ among the 
individual donors. How open a country is for trade is statistically significant 
for the allocation of Sweden and UK, which give more aid to recipients with 
a high degree of trade openness. Germany and Sweden seem to be the only 
donors acknowledging the increased trade cost facing recipients that are 
landlocked and give more Aid for Trade to landlocked recipients. In line with 
Hoeffler and Outram (2011), there is mixed evidence of the “small country 
                                                     
6 VIF-values over 10 for Rule of law and Government Effectiveness (all donors) 
5 Empirical results 
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bias” found in the paper by Alesina and Dollar (2000). Recipient countries 
with smaller population receive more Aid for Trade from the EU institutions, 
France and Sweden.  
All donors seem to be motivated by their self-interest, especially by 
colonial past. The colonial past is statistically significant for all the donors 
(as found in Alesina and Dollar, 2000). Both France and UK give more Aid 
for Trade to their old colonies. The colonial past of other European donors 
seems also to motivate all the European donors where Germany favours old 
colonies of UK and UK favours former colony of Germany. Sweden and UK, 
on the other hand, allocates less to former colonies of France. When looking 
at the EU Institutions, the only colonial past that seems to be statistically 
significant is if the recipient is a former colony of France. The EU Institutions 
and Sweden are also motivated by trade, favour their trading partners and 
allocate more Aid for Trade to them. The negative statistical significant 
estimate for UK (column 5) could potentially be explained by the donor 
allocating to recipient where the country has no ongoing trade relationship, 
but it might want to have in the future. The results suggest that both the 
recipient need, merits and the donors’ self-interest are important factors in 
explaining the Aid for Trade allocation among European donors but differs 
among the individual countries.   
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Table 2. How do European donor allocate Aid for Trade? All observations. Dependent variable: ln Aid for Trade per capita  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
VARIABLES EU OLS France OLS Germany 
OLS 
Sweden OLS UK OLS EU FE France FE Germany FE Sweden FE UK FE 
           
Poverty (t-1) 0.0283*** 0.00242 -0.0103 0.0107 0.0172* -0.000485 -0.00926 0.00267 -0.0261* -0.000326 
 [0.00563] [0.00886] [0.00767] [0.0143] [0.00949] [0.00619] [0.0134] [0.00881] [0.0140] [0.0170] 
Voice and Accountability (t-1) -0.161 -0.142 0.223 0.386 -0.178 -0.158 0.354 -0.161 -1.180** 0.111 
 [0.225] [0.414] [0.248] [0.498] [0.313] [0.240] [0.335] [0.294] [0.592] [0.465] 
Rule of Law(t-1) 0.294 0.877 0.202 -0.896 0.796 -0.000661 -0.212 -0.0763 0.257 0.194 
 [0.391] [0.677] [0.487] [0.917] [0.593] [0.361] [0.664] [0.305] [0.608] [0.667] 
Political Stability (t-1) -0.134 0.102 0.0191 0.635* -0.470** -0.0808 0.0681 0.0332 0.196 -0.0203 
 [0.153] [0.285] [0.182] [0.371] [0.210] [0.116] [0.251] [0.136] [0.171] [0.252] 
Regulatory Quality (t-1) 0.829*** 0.532 1.006*** 0.759 0.151 0.0429 -0.587 -0.104 -0.828 -1.068* 
 [0.241] [0.439] [0.305] [0.653] [0.398] [0.298] [0.470] [0.201] [0.502] [0.539] 
Control of Corruption (t-1) -0.279 -0.782 -0.211 -0.306 0.000968 1.148*** 0.199 0.222 -0.0273 0.274 
 [0.282] [0.534] [0.370] [0.730] [0.535] [0.370] [0.583] [0.416] [0.690] [0.821] 
Ln Growth (t-1) -0.00305 -0.0282 0.0295* 0.0465 -0.0280 -0.000144 -0.0307* -0.000890 -0.0225 -0.0198 
 [0.0130] [0.0211] [0.0156] [0.0360] [0.0260] [0.00893] [0.0169] [0.00797] [0.0190] [0.0233] 
Trade Openness (t-1) -0.00447 -0.00371 0.00441 0.0198*** 0.00707** 0.00125 0.00693 0.00188 0.00122 -0.00206 
 [0.00272] [0.00561] [0.00408] [0.00692] [0.00353] [0.00224] [0.00855] [0.00228] [0.00606] [0.00508] 
Ln Export (t-1) 0.180* 0.171 -0.0843 0.344* -0.386*** 0.345** 0.254 0.0839 0.102 -0.0346 
 [0.104] [0.182] [0.0782] [0.197] [0.129] [0.151] [0.202] [0.0634] [0.152] [0.246] 
Ln Population -0.848*** -0.675*** 0.0544 -0.643* 0.163 -0.471 -0.699 -1.278** -0.403 -2.210* 
 [0.106] [0.185] [0.116] [0.335] [0.173] [0.468] [0.859] [0.497] [0.980] [1.172] 
Landlocked 0.176 -0.885* 0.665** 1.629** -0.632 - - - - - 
 [0.267] [0.450] [0.308] [0.629] [0.386]      
Former colony France 0.458* 1.991*** -0.248 -2.732*** -0.767* - - - - - 
 [0.268] [0.530] [0.421] [0.731] [0.453]      
Former colony UK -0.381 0.527 -0.804** -0.266 1.571*** - - - - - 
 [0.319] [0.597] [0.329] [0.701] [0.321]      
Former colony Germany -0.296 -0.344 0.168 0.620 0.797** - - - - - 
 [0.355] [0.552] [0.385] [0.848] [0.349]      
GSP Signatory -0.464 0.169 0.0715 0.873 -0.121 - - - - - 
 [0.307] [0.515] [0.371] [0.773] [0.403]      
GSP+ Signatory -0.453 -0.520 -0.153 -0.838 -0.124 - - - - - 
 [0.334] [0.433] [0.393] [0.746] [0.571]      
APEC Member -1.255*** -0.123 -1.325*** -2.198** -0.391 - - - - - 
 [0.427] [0.726] [0.436] [0.860] [0.501]      
           
Observations 1,092 776 1,015 713 638 1,092 776 1,015 713 638 
R-squared 0.448 0.302 0.224 0.345 0.267 0.034 0.017 0.015 0.021 0.020 
F-statistics 16.27 8.96 3.99 9.01 9.25 2.00 1.59 1.32 1.43 1.06 
Number of pan_id      116 104 113 102 106 
           
Clustered(OLS) and robust(FE) standard errors in brackets *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0
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Another way to measure the relative importance of our proxies need, merit 
and self-interest is to add the variables to the regressions and look at the R-
squared value, a method used in Hoeffler and Outram (2011). The R-squared 
values range from 0-1 and measures how much explanatory power the 
explanatory variables has in explaining the variation in the dependent variable. 
As seen in Table 3, population and the other control variables can alone explain 
between 6.3% to 37.9% of the variation for the European donors in their Aid for 
Trade allocations. When adding the recipients need the R-squared increases only 
for Germany and UK, which could further indicate that most of the European 
donors are not motivated by the poverty rates in the recipient countries when 
allocating their Aid for Trade. In comparison, the proxies for the recipient merits 
and the donors’ self-interest increases the explanatory power for all the European 
donors. The increased R-squared value when adding merit, export and colonies 
indicates that merit and self-interest could explain more of the variation than the 
recipient needs. It also further indicates that the European donors differs in what 
motivates them.  
 
Table 3. How much of the variation is explained by need, merit, and self-interest?  
  EU Institutions France  Germany Sweden  United Kingdom 
Control variables 37.9% 21.2% 6.3% 18.5% 3.4% 
Recipients need 35.8% 17.6% 8.7% 18.2% 9.4% 
Recipients merit 40.7% 21.7% 20.2% 24.7% 14.2% 
Export (Self-interest)  43.3% 25.5% 20.2% 27.0% 15.6% 
Colonial past (Self-interest) 44.8% 30.2% 22.4% 34.5% 26.6% 
 
Our OLS regressions in estimation (1)-(5) may be biased due to unobserved 
country fixed effects that correlate with the error term (such as history, culture, 
religion etc.).  I will control for the time-invariant factors using either a fixed 
effects or random effects estimator. By running a Hausman test on the different 
European donors, the p-values indicate that a fixed effects model is preferred 
over a random effects model for all the donors.7 The fixed effect estimates are 
presented in columns (6)-(10) in Table 2. When running the fixed effect models, 
most of the estimates changes among the donors, indicating there is fixed effect 
                                                     
7 The p-value of the Hausman test: EU Institution 0.0009, France 0, Germany 0, Sweden 0 and UK 0. 
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to account for. Sweden is now the only European donor motivated by the 
recipients need in its allocation of Aid for Trade. The European donors also 
seems to be less merit focused, where Sweden gives less aid to recipient with a 
higher level of poverty and a higher level of democracy. The EU Institution 
allocates more to recipients with a higher control of corruption and UK allocates 
less to recipients with higher level of regulatory quality. France allocates less 
Aid for Trade to countries with good economic policies. The only European 
donors allocating their Aid for Trade according to self-interest seems to be the 
EU Institutions. To see if the fixed effects model is preferred over the pooled 
OLS model, a F-test is conducted on all the European donors (as in Hoeffler and 
Outram, 2011). The F-test is run to test if fixed effects are equal to zero. The 
results of the F-test show that we cannot reject the null hypothesis on 10% 
significant level for all European donors except the EU Institutions. The 
conservative fixed effects model is therefore preferred when looking at the EU 
Institutions but for all others, the pooled OLS model with cluster standard errors 
is preferred over the fixed effects model. 
5.1.2 Common observations 
I restrict the sample to only common observations, according to the method 
prosed by Hoeffler and Outram (2011), to be able to overcome the issue that the 
donor equations are estimated using different samples. Many of the observations 
are dropped and only around 25% remains after restricting the sample to only 
common observations. This indicates that the European donor differs from its 
European counterparts in their allocation of Aid for Trade each year and to 
whom they allocate. The new OLS estimates are presented in columns (1)-(5) in 
Table 4. The estimates for the recipients’ merits have changed and the donors 
seem to allocate even more according to individual merit preferences, where the 
EU Institutions are more motivated by the recipients’ merits in comparison to its 
European counterparts. Removing the observations from the sample has no 
significant impact on the recipient need (except Sweden seems to favour poor 
countries) and colonial past and trade are still significant motivators for the 
European donors. Germany is the only country not allocating Aid for Trade 
based on neither recipients’ merits or needs. The estimation also indicates a 
“small country bias” for EU Institutions and Sweden. 
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As for the OLS estimates using all the observations, the OLS regressions 
using only the common observation may be biased due to unobserved fixed 
effects. Therefore, the fixed effects model is used to control for the recipients-
specific fixed effect. As for the sample with all the observations, a F-test is used 
to determine if fixed effects are equal to zero. The test indicates that we can 
reject the null-hypothesis on the 5 % level and that fixed effects are jointly 
significant for all the European donors (when using the sample with only 
common observations). The time-invariant factors are controlled for and the 
results are presented in columns (6)-(10) in Table 4. Taking fixed effects into 
account changes many coefficients on the explanatory variables. Sweden is the 
only donor motivated by the recipient need but allocates less Aid for Trade to 
poorer recipients. When controlling for fixed effects, the European donors seems 
to be penalizing recipient with higher merits. Sweden and Germany give less 
Aid for Trade to recipients with a high degree of democracy. Germany and 
France allocate less Aid for Trade to recipients with a higher political stability. 
France allocate less Aid for Trade to recipients with higher level of regulatory 
quality and UK gives less to recipients more open to trade. The negative effect 
found on Aid for Trade and recipients merits could be due to donors directing 
their Aid for Trade to recipient which has lower merits (and therefore may be in 
more need of assistance). The European Union and Germany favour their trading 
partners. The huge cut in sample size and the different results indicates that the 
European donors are driven by different motives when allocating its Aid for 
Trade.
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Table 4. How do European donor allocate Aid for Trade? Common observations. Dependent variable: ln Aid for Trade per capita. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
VARIABLES EU OLS France OLS Germany 
OLS 
Sweden OLS UK OLS EU FE France FE Germany FE Sweden FE UK FE 
Poverty (t-1) 0.0279*** 0.00346 -0.00271 0.0281* 0.0203** 0.00333 -0.0376 -0.00470 -0.0438* 0.0130 
 [0.00732] [0.0119] [0.00707] [0.0164] [0.00920] [0.0143] [0.0247] [0.0105] [0.0233] [0.0205] 
Voice and Accountability (t-1) -0.512* -0.842 -0.152 0.759 -0.747** -0.178 0.0717 -0.817** -3.266*** 1.554 
 [0.274] [0.510] [0.245] [0.501] [0.343] [0.358] [0.879] [0.336] [0.896] [0.989] 
Rule of Law (t-1) 0.926* 0.324 0.507 -1.137 0.288 -0.133 1.041 0.350 -0.462 0.0266 
 [0.539] [0.815] [0.456] [1.246] [0.630] [0.535] [1.122] [0.445] [1.172] [0.791] 
Political Stability (t-1) 0.193 0.138 0.228 1.192** -0.0682 0.178 -0.876** -0.309* 0.562 0.0681 
 [0.222] [0.341] [0.155] [0.458] [0.217] [0.166] [0.411] [0.158] [0.344] [0.266] 
Regulatory Quality (t-1) 0.00268 0.701 0.465 0.649 -0.394 0.0692 -1.295* 0.276 -0.717 -0.817 
 [0.388] [0.716] [0.367] [0.948] [0.484] [0.495] [0.738] [0.259] [1.006] [0.770] 
Control of Corruption (t-1) -0.630* 0.122 -0.438 -1.206 0.699 0.154 -0.385 -0.496 -0.791 -0.134 
 [0.369] [0.564] [0.315] [0.970] [0.580] [0.449] [1.129] [0.464] [1.035] [1.133] 
Ln Growth (t-1) 0.0233 -0.0628* 0.0380 0.00459 -0.0348 0.00161 -0.0126 0.0116 -0.0347 -0.0253 
 [0.0297] [0.0348] [0.0237] [0.0488] [0.0297] [0.0273] [0.0231] [0.00759] [0.0248] [0.0236] 
Trade Openness (t-1) -0.00607 0.00524 0.00338 0.0129 -0.000935 -0.00129 0.00484 0.000150 0.00120 -0.0137** 
 [0.00490] [0.00846] [0.00464] [0.00881] [0.00455] [0.00334] [0.00832] [0.00305] [0.00619] [0.00613] 
Ln Export (-1) 0.270* 0.0121 0.00182 0.181 -0.263** 0.805** 0.130 0.186** 0.273 0.334 
 [0.157] [0.187] [0.0767] [0.303] [0.131] [0.319] [0.402] [0.0768] [0.260] [0.283] 
Ln Population -1.157*** -0.397 -0.135 -0.662* 0.0565 -0.0207 -1.843 -1.488*** -0.806 -3.278*** 
 [0.189] [0.358] [0.125] [0.381] [0.188] [0.785] [1.622] [0.455] [1.413] [1.119] 
Landlocked -0.0916 -1.214* 0.434* 1.478* -0.498      
 [0.395] [0.647] [0.249] [0.848] [0.421]      
GSP Signatory 0.00826 2.882*** -0.101 -3.468*** -1.011***      
 [0.268] [0.679] [0.357] [0.920] [0.371]      
GSP+ Signatory -0.495 0.625 -0.438* 0.688 1.345***      
 [0.342] [0.661] [0.250] [0.728] [0.361]      
APEC member 0.111 -0.483 0.0318 0.398 0.700*      
 [0.403] [0.751] [0.256] [0.899] [0.412]      
Former colony France -0.536 -1.004 -0.760** 1.764** -0.482      
 [0.426] [0.623] [0.293] [0.845] [0.409]      
Former colony Germany -0.860 0.0139 0.0642 -1.437 -0.100      
 [0.534] [0.646] [0.490] [1.107] [0.548]      
Former colony UK -0.747 0.310 -0.800** -1.229 -0.320      
 [0.548] [0.712] [0.399] [1.063] [0.572]      
Observations 341 341 341 341 341 341 341 341 341 341 
R-squared 0.585 0.297 0.282 0.422 0.319 0.060 0.049 0.095 0.072 0.062 
F-statistics 17.35 6.58 5.31 10.22 15.03 0.98 2.04 2.83 2.13 2.83 
Number of pan_id      76 76 76 76 76 
*Robust standard errors in brackets*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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5.2 How does the European donors differ from the 
US and Japan? 
5.2.1 All observations: The US and Japan 
In the third stage of the empirical analysis, the allocation of the European 
donors will be compared to two other donors outside Europe: The US and 
Japan. The estimates indicate no evidence that Japan or the US are motivated 
by the recipients need or their trade interest when allocating their Aid for 
Trade. The OLS regressions (1)-(2) presented in Table 5 indicate that both 
Japan and the US seems only to be motivated by the recipients’ merits. Japan 
rewards recipients with higher rule of law and economic growth while higher 
government effectiveness receives significantly less Aid for Trade. The US 
rewards regulatory quality and the level of democracy. There’s indication of 
the small country bias in both estimates.  
What seems to be of statistical significance for both Japan and the US, after 
controlling of fixed effects, is if the recipient is a trade partner. Both donors 
reward their trade partners by more Aid for Trade. Columns (3)-(4) in Table 
5 control for the country fixed effect potentially biasing the OLS estimates 
presented in columns (1)-(2). As for the sample with European donors, a F-
test is used to determine if fixed effects are equal to zero. The test indicates 
that we can reject the null-hypothesis on the 5% level and the test indicates 
that fixed effects are significant and the OLS estimations are not valid. In 
addition to favour its trading partners, Japan seems to be responsive to the 
recipients needs and allocates more Aid for Trade to poorer countries. In the 
case of the US, trade relations are the only variable motivating the donor in 
its Aid for Trade allocation. 
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Table 5.  How does the US and Japan allocate their Aid for Trade? Dependent Variable: ln Aid for Trade per capita. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES Japan OLS USA OLS Japan FE USA FE 
     
Poverty (t-1) -0.0103 -0.00614 -0.0221** -0.00144 
 [0.00741] [0.00786] [0.00873] [0.00778] 
Voice and Accountability (t-1) -0.0313 0.498* -0.259 -0.357 
 [0.254] [0.292] [0.185] [0.300] 
Rule of Law(t-1) 1.821*** -0.454 -0.320 0.676 
 [0.399] [0.515] [0.273] [0.445] 
Political Stability (t-1) 0.154 -0.343 0.0972 -0.0374 
 [0.254] [0.218] [0.125] [0.128] 
Regulatory Quality (t-1) -0.769** 1.348*** 0.0470 -0.443 
 [0.309] [0.318] [0.214] [0.465] 
Control of Corruption (t-1) -0.535* -0.406 0.903** -0.344 
 [0.320] [0.425] [0.355] [0.354] 
Ln Growth (t-1) 0.0421*** -0.00239 0.00848 -0.00865 
 [0.0147] [0.0185] [0.0119] [0.0113] 
Trade Openness (t-1) -0.000280 0.00501 -0.00169 0.00270 
 [0.00338] [0.00436] [0.00255] [0.00376] 
Ln Export (t-1) 0.129 -0.165 0.334*** 0.445*** 
 [0.0963] [0.121] [0.0881] [0.134] 
Ln Population -0.452*** -0.300** -0.883 -0.392 
 [0.132] [0.143] [0.575] [0.695] 
Landlocked 0.134 0.471 - - 
 [0.285] [0.357] - - 
GSP Signatory 0.828** 0.353 - - 
 [0.372] [0.432] - - 
GSP+ Signatory 0.555 0.714* - - 
 [0.373] [0.391] - - 
APEC member 0.606 -1.167** - - 
 [0.629] [0.534] - - 
     
Observations 1,166 1,027 1,166 1,027 
R-squared 0.409 0.292 0.063 0.035 
F-statistics 18.86 7.43 3.56 1.94 
Number of pan_id   119 125 
Clustered (OLS) and robust(FE) standard errors in brackets 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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5.2.2 Common observations: European donors, US and Japan 
To be able to compare the European donors with Japan and the US, the 
sample will be restricted, and all the non-common observation will be 
dropped (as in Hoeffler and Outram, 2011). As it turns out, no more drops 
are needed after restricting the sample to the European donors to have a 
sample size with common observations for all the donors, including the US 
and Japan. The results are presented in Table 6.  
The European donors’ allocation of Aid for Trade seems to be more 
motivated by the recipients’ merits in comparison to Japan and the US 
(except the EU Institutions) and the European donors give less aid to 
recipient with higher governmental qualities. Economic growth and trade 
openness are factors that do not seem to motivate any of the donors (except 
UK which allocates significantly less to recipient more open to trade).  Japan 
is also motivated by the recipients’ merits, but not to the same extent as the 
European donors and gives less Aid for Trade to more democratic recipients.  
There’s mixed indications of motivation according to a recipient need: 
Sweden and Japan are the only donors motivated by poverty but allocates 
less Aid for Trade to poorer countries. What seems to be of statistically 
significance for the EU Institutions and the US is not need, nor merit. In 
comparison to the other donors, the only significant parameters are self-
interest. The more trade the EU Institutions and US has with a recipient, the 
more Aid for Trade the recipient receives. Self-interest is nothing 
characteristic only to the US and EU Institutions, Germany and Japan are 
also giving more Aid for Trade to their trade partners.  
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Table 6. How do the donors differ? Common observations. Dependent variable: ln Aid for Trade per capita.  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
VARIABLES EU FE France FE Germany FE Japan FE Sweden FE UK FE USA FE 
Poverty (t-1) 0.00333 -0.0376 -0.00470 -0.0345* -0.0438* 0.0130 0.00663 
 [0.0143] [0.0247] [0.0105] [0.0186] [0.0233] [0.0205] [0.00975] 
Voice and Accountability (t-1) -0.178 0.0717 -0.817** -0.842* -3.266*** 1.554 0.352 
 [0.358] [0.879] [0.336] [0.447] [0.896] [0.989] [0.524] 
Rule of Law (t-1) -0.133 1.041 0.350 -0.0325 -0.462 0.0266 -0.358 
 [0.535] [1.122] [0.445] [0.469] [1.172] [0.791] [0.451] 
Political Stability (t-1) 0.178 -0.876** -0.309* -0.124 0.562 0.0681 0.183 
 [0.166] [0.411] [0.158] [0.187] [0.344] [0.266] [0.159] 
Government Effectiveness (t-1) 0.0692 -1.295* 0.276 -0.539 -0.717 -0.817 0.0763 
 [0.495] [0.738] [0.259] [0.403] [1.006] [0.770] [0.365] 
Regulatory Quality (t-1) 0.154 -0.385 -0.496 0.0164 -0.791 -0.134 0.649 
 [0.449] [1.129] [0.464] [0.511] [1.035] [1.133] [0.734] 
Ln Growth (t-1) 0.00161 -0.0126 0.0116 0.0320 -0.0347 -0.0253 -0.00768 
 [0.0273] [0.0231] [0.00759] [0.0256] [0.0248] [0.0236] [0.0240] 
Trade Openness (t-1) -0.00129 0.00484 0.000150 -0.000779 0.00120 -0.0137** 0.00423 
 [0.00334] [0.00832] [0.00305] [0.00334] [0.00619] [0.00613] [0.00415] 
Ln Export (t-1) 0.805** 0.130 0.186** 0.594*** 0.273 0.334 0.353* 
 [0.319] [0.402] [0.0768] [0.178] [0.260] [0.283] [0.187] 
Ln Population -0.0207 -1.843 -1.488*** -1.390* -0.806 -3.278*** -1.676** 
 [0.785] [1.622] [0.455] [0.759] [1.413] [1.119] [0.641] 
        
Observations 341 341 341 341 341 341 341 
R-squared 0.060 0.049 0.095 0.141 0.072 0.062 0.060 
F-statistics 0.98 2.04 2.83 1.86 2.13 2.83 1.76 
Number of pan_id 76 76 76 76 76 76 76 
Robust standard errors in brackets *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.      
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5.3 Robustness tests and discussion 
5.3.1 Robustness tests on the European donors 
 
Too see if my results are robust, I conduct several sensitivity tests using 
the sample with all observations and OLS-regressions (since they are 
preferred over the fixed effect model). 
The results are robust to various specification of governmental merits, 
except the poverty level for UK loses significance when removing either 
Rule of Law or Political Stability. The results are also robust when running 
the regressions without the variable proxying good economic policies, GDP 
per capita growth. Additionally, the results are robust when running the 
regression using the unmanipulated poverty data (see Appendix 3). The 
estimated results on poverty (not all European donors are motivated by 
poverty) contrast with the results in Hoeffler and Outram (2011). Their 
results indicated that all the major donors are allocating development aid to 
poorer countries, when measuring poverty as GDP per capita. Instead of 
using the poverty headcount ratio, I therefore run the regressions using GDP 
per capita, which normally is used as proxy for a recipient need (e.g., Alesina 
and Dollar, 2000; Hoeffler and Outram, 2011).  The new estimates indicate 
that the European donors are more poverty focused where all the donors, 
except France, allocate more Aid for Trade to poorer recipients (see 
Appendix 4). This could mean that using national income as a proxy for 
development need yields different results than actual poverty data or that Aid 
for Trade is treated differently than development aid but could also mean that 
GDP per capita is a bad measurement to use when looking at trade related 
assistance. Countries may want to give more Aid for Trade to recipients with 
higher GDP per capita because of potential future trade gains, and therefore 
the variable might be misleading as proxy for need and affects the estimates 
in the regressions (since more Aid for Trade might lead to higher GDP per 
capita, which leads to more Aid for Trade etc.). However, the positive aspect 
of using GDP per capita as a proxy for need is that the data contains less 
missing observations than actual poverty data.  
The donors also seem to be motivated differently by needs and merits 
when allocating Aid for Trade to countries outside Africa. Since Africa has 
been argued to be special in terms of donor-recipients relationship (Moyo, 
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2009; Bourguignon and Sundberg, 2007; Goldsmith, 2001), I drop the 
African countries from the sample. Restricting the sample changes the results 
(see Appendix 5). For countries outside Africa, the poverty level of the 
recipient country seems only to matter for Germany and both the EU 
Institutions and UK are no longer allocating more Aid for Trade to poorer 
countries. The European donors are also less motivated by the governmental 
merits and only higher regulatory quality is rewarded by the EU Institutions, 
Germany and the UK. The European donors are still motivated by their self-
interest. Colonial past is still significant for all the donors and Sweden and 
UK are still rewarding their trade partners. The result indicates that countries 
in Africa are treated differently regarding needs and merits. 
5.3.2 Discussion  
 
The results are not clear or straightforward and the European donors does 
not seem to be motivated by the same factors. One reason could be that many 
factors that plays a role cannot be easily measured. The relationship between 
aid and poverty reduction is complex and it is difficult to establish causation 
due to many things coincide and correlates. Even if donors are European they 
are still individual countries driven by their own motives, the majority not 
captured by the estimations. However, what seems to be a motivation for all 
the countries is colonial past. In Table 2, column (1)-(5), former colony 
owners France and UK allocates more to their former colonies, but the EU 
Institutions is also motivated by the colonial past of France. These results 
could be due to the internal politics within the EU Institutions and could 
indicate that France may have an influential role in the Aid for Trade 
allocation process. Germany, on the other hand, does not give more aid to its 
former colonies. This may reflect how close the colonial past is, Germany 
lost all is colonies in 1918 and France and UK had their colonies up until 
1997. The last colony of France in the dataset is Vanatau, which gained its 
independence in 1980, and for UK Brunei, which gained its independence in 
1984. Other than colonial past, the European donors seems to be motivated 
differently by need, merit and self-interest. These results are not surprising 
due to the European Union being a highly cultural diverse region and the 
countries are probably driven by different motives even if sharing a common 
Aid for Trade strategy. The limits to my approach are therefore many.  
The methodology poses significant challenges to determine the allocation 
of the donors, especially due to a potential sample selection problem because 
not all donors give aid to all countries (for a further discussion see 
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McGillivray, 2002). To account for the problem, either a two stage Heckman 
model or the Tobit estimator is normally used. Very few studies using a Tobit 
estimator or Heckman model have resulted in findings that differ 
significantly from the estimation made by OLS.8 Therefore, I have decided 
not to use a Heckman model or a Tobit estimator, but the estimates could still 
be biased. Additionally, I follow the method set out in Hoeffler and Outram 
(2011) and restrict the sample to only common observations in Table 4 and 
6, but the approach of having only common observation has a major 
drawback. By restricting the observations the coefficients loose information 
about the true allocation behaviour of the European donors, Japan and the 
US. The huge cut in sample size and the different results indicates that the 
European donors are driven by different motives and allocates their Aid for 
Trade differently each year. Therefore, there might be problem with a sample 
selection bias from a non-random subsample in the estimates presented in 
Table 4 and 6. Because of the big sample drop (deleting 75% of the sample 
size), and due to the potential bias, the samples using all the observations will 
be preferred (Table 2 and 5). The time and lags (one year) decided in the 
methodology might not also be correct for many of the variables since it can 
take a few years before the donors react. Longer lags on the lagged variables 
could then have resulted in different estimates.  
Another limitation to my approach is the fact that donors’ decisions might 
not be independent from each other. Donors’ may seek to complement or 
coordinate each other’s actions, or they could be otherwise influenced by 
others (e.g., Sweden and UK could be giving less to former colonies of 
France because France is giving their colonies more). There are many aspects 
adding to the complexity of the problem, making it difficult to establish 
causality and unbiased estimates. 
Another limitation to my study is the availability and nature of the data. 
The complexity of the problem makes it challenging to find data to proxy 
need, merit and self-interest. Data on poverty and governmental merits is 
sometime limited due to developing countries being exposed to political 
instability and conflicts, and there is no accepted objective measurement of 
governmental qualities. The WGI are criticised for being too complex and 
not easy to replicate (Kaufmann et al., 2007). Additionally, I only use trade 
and colonial past to proxy a donors’ self-interest, a concept probably much 
broader. There is also exclusion of trade in services in the export data, but 
                                                     
8 See McGillivray and White (1993), Alesina and Dollar (2000), Hoeffler and Outram (2011), 
McGillivray (2002), Thiele et al. (2007), Berthélemy (2006a, b) and Fleck and Kilby (2010) 
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due to the sample containing developing countries, the potential bias 
resulting from the exclusion should be modest.  
The measurement of the dependent variable also imposes challenges. The 
CRS data base is recognized as being the best existing data source for Aid 
for Trade flows, but it also has its limitations. The database is made up by 
aid flows from members of the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) 
and excludes some of the multilateral agencies and major donors such as 
China and non-European DAC members. Second, it could be likely that the 
QWIDS data set is overestimating the Aid for Trade volumes since they 
include projects that potentially could have no impact on the recipients’ 
capacity to trade or no objectives related to trade at all. The CSR data can tell 
how much aid that went to a specific sector but cannot show the impact of 
the project on trade performance.  
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The potential of Aid for Trade to eradicate poverty has been highly 
recognized and the popularity among policy makers and development 
organization has grown since the initiative started. Earlier studies regarding 
development aid has found that aid is motivated by the needs and merit of 
the recipient countries, but that self-interest tend to outweigh other motives 
of the donor. I revisit this question using Aid for Trade data between 2005-
2015 and investigate how the largest donor in the world, the European 
donors, allocate their Aid for Trade. The results are not straight forward and 
clear, indicating that the complexity of the problem makes it difficult to 
establish causation. Additionally, the European donors seem to be motivated 
differently by need, merit and self-interest even if sharing a common 
strategy.  However, my results indicate that most of the European donors are 
not motivated by the recipient need but rather by self-interest, even if the 
European donors claims to be driven by altruistic motives. I find indications 
that the colonial past is statistically significant among all the European 
donors, where UK and France allocate more Aid for Trade to its former 
colonies. These results correspond to earlier studies of development aid, 
where especially France favouring its old colonies (Alesina and Dollar, 
2000). Most of the European donors also seem to be motivated by trade and 
all the European donors are motivated differently by the governmental 
qualities. 
 I also find indications that the recipients are treated differently depending 
on their geographical location. If a recipient is in Africa, the donors are 
motivated differently by need and merit and there is probably other 
heterogenous effects in other geographical locations. As in Hoeffler and 
Outram (2011), I found unobserved country fixed effects to be significant for 
some of the donors when using a restricted sample. All these results indicate 
that there is still a poor understanding of donors’ behaviour and what 
motivates them in the allocation of aid.  
However, there are indication that the European donors are somewhat 
motivated differently than Japan and US. The European Aid for Trade 
allocation seems to be more altruistic in comparison to the US (except the 
EU Institutions). The US seem to be placing no importance on either the 
recipient merit or need, and only be focusing on trade. However, Japan seem 
to be more motivated by the need of the recipient than the European donor 
and allocates more Aid for Trade to poorer countries. On the other hand, 
Japan also favour its trading partners. All these results indicate that there is 
still a poor understanding of donors’ behaviour and what motivates them in 
6 Conclusions and further research 
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the allocation of aid. Further research is needed both to investigate what 
motivates donors in aid allocation but also how (and if) the aid allocation 
process differs between development aid and Aid for Trade.  
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Appendix 1. Summary Statistics. Recipients need and merits between 2005-2015. 
        
VARIABLES Africa Asia Americas Europe Middle East Oceania All 
        
Voice and Accountability        
Observations 550 308 341 132 99 132 1562 
Min. value -2.226 -2.259 -1.887 -1.767 -1.907 -1.106 -2.259 
Max. value 0.970 0.746 1.293 1.092 0.774 1.217 1.293 
Mean Value -0.581 -0.763 0.281 0.101 -0.897 0.543 -.296 
Standard deviation 0.706 0.757 0.676 0.656 0.695 0.563 .849 
        
Political Stability        
Observations 550 308 341 132 99 132 1562 
Min. value -2.699 -2.810 -2.056 2.021 -2.827 -0.926 -2.827 
Max. value 1.200 1.283 1.285 1.148 0.946 1.454 1.454 
Mean Value -0.465 -0.628 -0.022 -0.005 -1.178 0.783 -0.301 
Standard deviation 0.814 0.878 0.702 0.599 0.970 0.610 0.903 
        
Regulatory Quality        
Observations 550 308 341 132 99 132 1562 
Min. value -2.243 -2.268 -1.885 -1.623 -1.720 -1.405 -2.268 
Max. value 1.127 1.113 1.539 1.423 1.317 0.29 1.539 
Mean Value -0.643 -0.534 -0.003 0.079 -0.225 -0.746 -0.403 
Standard deviation 0.580 0.708 0.725 0.636 0.832 0.357 0.714 
        
Government Effectiveness        
Observations 550 308 341 132 99 132 1562 
Min. value -1.848 -1.6179 -2.041 -1.13 -1.719 -1.60 -2.041 
Max. value 1.049 1.267 1.572 1.564 1.392 0.509 1.572 
Mean Value -0.710 -0.402 -0.059 -0.003 -0.269 -0.591 -0.410 
Standard deviation 0.596 0.675 0.684 0.702 0.767 0.392 0.696 
        
Rule of Law        
Observations 550 308 341 132 99 132 1562 
Min. value -1.852 -1.897 -2.032 -1.334 -1.838 -1.086 -2.032 
Max. value 1.029 1.029 1.433 1.216 1.162 1.272 1.433 
Mean Value -0.644 -0.603 -0.211 -0.141 -0.330 0.115 -0.415 
Standard Deviations 0.595 0.629 0.782 0.629 0.802 0.612 0.711 
        
Continuation of Appendix 1.        
VARIABLES Africa Asia Americas Europe Middle East Oceania All 
Control of Corruption        
Observations 550 308 341 132 99 132 1562 
Min. value -1.773 -1.673 -1.40 -1.13 -1.56 -1.34 -1.773 
Max. value 1.16 1.28 1.72 1.25 1.01 0.77 1.72 
Mean value -0.586 -0.69 -0.02 -0.14 -0.33 -0.25 -0.401 
Standard Deviations 0.588 0.583 0.79 0.61 0.70 0.40 0.68 
        
GDP per capita growth (annual %)        
Observations 550 308 341 132 99 132 1562 
Min. value -36.83 -15.421 -13.143 -14.421 -29.886 -9.655 -36.83 
Max. value 18.30 33.03 12.950 13.830 10.288 34.794 34.794 
Mean Value 2.309 5.166 2.317 2.827 0.787 2.834 2.866 
Standard deviation 4.216 4.609 3.524 4.452 5.068 7.493 4.756 
        
Trade (% of GDP)        
Observations 550 308 341 132 99 132 1562 
8 Appendix 
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Min. value 0 .167 22.106 69.591 32.727 0 0 
Max. value 2.31 203.85 203.829 157.974 147.539 165.110 311.4 
Mean Value 80.25 85.11 79.53 103.3 81.55 90.39 83.94 
Standard deviation 40.23 41.25 30.55 20.60 22.51 45.18 37.29 
        
Poverty at 1.90$ a day        
Observations 517 297 220 132 77 110 1353 
Min. value 0.4 0 0 0 0 0.6 0 
Max. value 78.5 43 27.8 19.6 19.8 45.6   78.5 
Mean Value 37.51 9.67 7.05 2.41 2.71 12.12 18.98 
Standard deviation 23.57 10.41 6.33 4.82 5.17 13.03 21.89 
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Appendix 2. Summary Statistics. Donors export and Aid for Trade between 2005-2015 
       
VARIABLES Africa Asia Americas Europe Middle 
East 
Oceania 
European Union       
Aid for Trade (2015 USD millions)       
Observations 550 308 341 132 99 132 
Min. value 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Max. value 607.6 2317 299.7 680.63 75.08 16.36 
Mean Value 27.63 41.13 9.108 50.07 6.659 1.272 
Standard deviation 49.73 261.2 23.30 102.1 13.15 2.635 
       
Export to recipient (USD millions)       
Observations 550 308 341 132 99 132 
Min. value 0 7.953 20.59 0 48.83 0.1 
Max. value 36,496 217,443 53,177 14,892.7 4,5479.5 2,067.4 
Mean Value 3,132 13,847 3,809 3,177 9,572 104.6 
Standard deviation 6,438 32,673 8,797 3,894 10,846 285.1 
       
France       
Aid for Trade (2015 USD millions)        
Observations 550 308 341 132 99 132 
Min. value 0 -0.697 0 0 0 0 
Max. value 312.9 179 366.42 17.43 113.29 5.9 
Mean Value 11.16 8.132 5.451 0.521 3.367 0.124 
Standard deviation 30.86 23.47 26.96 2.066 13.40 0.729 
       
Export to recipient (USD millions)       
Observation 550 308 341 132 99 132 
Min. value 0.036 0.033 0.79 0 4.85 0 
Max. value 8,175 21,469 6,297 1,741.23 5,190.5 401.4 
Mean Value 649.7 1,474 429.6 360.5 1,108 8.504 
Standard deviation 1,367 3,312 998.1 435.0 1,139 37.86 
       
Germany       
Aid for Trade (2015 USD millions)       
Observations 550 308 341 132 99 132 
Min. value 0 0 0 0 -0.25 0 
Max. value 358.65 963.78 286.96 103.61 7.65 2.59 
Mean Value 9.022 32.16 6.9 11.00 0.939 0.0575 
Standard deviation 26.05 88.04 24.41 17.75 1.565 0.249 
       
Export to recipient (USD millions)       
Observations 550 308 341 132 99 132 
Min. value 0.423 0.033 0.89 0 4.85 0 
Max. value 12,172 99,196 15,631 7,768.6 12,338.6 756.47 
Mean Value 568.5 3,636 830.4 1,175 1,885 19.70 
Standard deviation 1,507 12,058 2,343 1,659 2,576 90.18 
       
       
United Kingdom       
Aid for Trade (2015 USD millions)       
Observations 550 308 341 132 99 132 
Min. value -0.782 0 -1.79 0 0 0 
Max. value 158.06 203.73 76.14 3.33 43.45 1.27 
Mean value 6.027 12.54 1.296 0.178 1.605 0.0296 
Standard deviation 15.52 30.25 6.510 0.508 5.738 0.154 
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Appendix 2. Continuation.        
VARIABLES Africa Asia Americas Europe Middle 
East 
Oceania 
       
       
Export to recipient (USD millions)       
Observations 550 308 341 132 99 132 
Min. value 0.127 0.2 3.68 0 1.67 0 
Max. value 6,846 27,625 5,902 1,927.9 8,300.4 84.57 
Mean value 281.1 1,392 294.8 263.2 1,082 5.392 
Standard devation 738.3 3,251 714.1 322.2 1,610 13.12 
       
Sweden       
Aid for Trade (2015 USD millions)       
Observations 550 308 341 132 99 132 
Min. value -.119773 -18.25 -0.07 -0.007 -0.0003 -0.0004 
Max. value 43.88607 12.96 10.22 17.45 7.48 .0006 
Mean value 1.944 0.776 0.397 2.385 0.669 1.79e-06 
Standard deviation 5.515 2.366 1.485  3.498 1.554 6.36e-05 
       
Export to recipient (USD millions)       
Observations 550 308 341 132 99 132 
Min. value 0 0 0.09 0 0 0 
Max. value 1573 6,061 2,015 708.99 1,931.1 23.84 
Mean value 83.62 413.3 114.5 100.4 317.2 1.550 
Standard deviation 206.6 951.7 265.4 134.1 449.6 4.201 
       
Japan       
Aid for Trade (2015 USD millions)       
Observations 550 308 341 132 99 132 
Min. value 0 0 0 0 0 0.14 
Max. value 218.27 1,321 53.44 73.39 542.82 17.7 
Mean value 10.37 120.9  4.360 3.091 16.03 4.493 
Standard deviation 22.44 225.0 7.631 10.01 66.31 4.174 
       
Export to recipient (USD millions)       
Observations 550 308 341 132 99 132 
Min. value .03 0.54 2.76 0 0.16 0.09 
Max. value 4,627.72 162,035 15,524.9 2,026.1 8,228.3 1,984.5 
Mean value 212.0 9,563 1,061 121.1 1,464 126.2 
Standard deviation 607.4 24,989 2,596 248.9 2,049 343.7 
       
United States       
Aid for Trade (2015 USD millions)       
Observations 550 308 341 132 99 132 
Min. value 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Max. value 367.77 1,392 130.35 138.61 3,148.9 26.56 
Mean value 15.62 45.49 10.34 17.52 108.5 0.662 
Standard deviation 40.03 169.1 22.21 26.49 475.5 3.357 
       
Export to recipient (USD millions)       
Observations 550 308 341 132 99 132 
Min. value 0.11 123,675 59.0923 0 0.351 .04246 
Max. value 367.76 7,105 240247.1 2,136.8 19,738.9 391.38 
Mean value 541.9 7,105 9,940 246.5 3,629 35.60 
Standard deviation 1,272 18,353 32,357 395.3 5,392 56.84 
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Robust standard errors in brackets 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Appendix 3. OLS regression using unmanipulated poverty data    
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
VARIABLES EU OLS France OLS Germany OLS Sweden OLS UK OLS 
      
Poverty(t-1) 0.0316*** 0.0135 -0.00591 0.0386 0.0234* 
 [0.00819] [0.0146] [0.0138] [0.0260] [0.0140] 
Voice and Accountability (t-1) -0.124 -0.746 -0.0905 0.00335 -0.858** 
 [0.347] [0.549] [0.371] [0.748] [0.338] 
Rule of Law(t-1) 0.195 0.758 0.466 -0.927 2.168*** 
 [0.511] [1.144] [0.592] [1.119] [0.809] 
Political Stability (t-1) -0.264 0.0394 -0.247 0.413 0.0678 
 [0.265] [0.366] [0.241] [0.489] [0.255] 
Government Effectiveness (t-1) -0.487 -0.757 -0.158 -1.027 -0.665 
 [0.534] [1.102] [0.693] [1.322] [0.639] 
Regulatory Quality (t-1) 0.573 0.806 0.731 1.216 -0.0124 
 [0.366] [0.900] [0.536] [0.903] [0.565] 
Control of Corruption (t-1) 0.0202 -0.0348 0.186 0.144 -0.403 
 [0.544] [0.726] [0.508] [1.004] [0.653] 
Ln Growth (t-1) -0.00408 -0.0346 0.0208 0.0352 -0.0344 
 [0.0239] [0.0480] [0.0231] [0.0587] [0.0461] 
Trade Openess (t-1) -0.00822 -0.00888 -0.00415 0.0234** 0.000649 
 [0.00550] [0.00780] [0.00660] [0.0113] [0.00498] 
Ln Export (t-1) 0.443*** 0.115 -0.0113 0.178 -0.475*** 
 [0.158] [0.242] [0.108] [0.275] [0.149] 
Ln Population -1.180*** -0.563* -0.334* -0.648 0.271 
 [0.156] [0.322] [0.201] [0.407] [0.186] 
Landlocked 0.550* -1.450** 0.924** 1.267 -0.884* 
 [0.328] [0.674] [0.454] [0.788] [0.445] 
Former colony France 0.0813 1.690* -0.868 -3.808*** -1.723** 
 [0.342] [0.874] [0.659] [1.122] [0.762] 
Former colony UK -0.294 -0.104 -0.589 0.399 1.574*** 
 [0.384] [0.711] [0.380] [0.831] [0.520] 
Former colony Germany -0.0576 -1.139 -0.212 -0.184 0.531 
 [0.422] [0.840] [0.573] [1.001] [0.582] 
GSP Signatory -0.298 0.154 0.0181 0.236 -0.134 
 [0.453] [0.535] [0.512] [1.187] [0.554] 
GSP+ Signatory -0.255 0.0725 -0.0291 -1.113 0.400 
 [0.444] [0.623] [0.606] [1.142] [0.666] 
APEC member -0.412 0.0836 -0.0657 -1.337 -0.0151 
 [0.437] [0.636] [0.449] [1.055] [0.529] 
      
Observations 390 297 402 283 252 
R-squared 0.443 0.202 0.234 0.381 0.276 
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Appendix 4. OLS regression using GDP per capita as proxy for recipient need. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
VARIABLES EU OLS France OLS Germany OLS Sweden OLS UK OLS 
      
GDP per capita constant 2010 USD (t-1) -1.125*** -0.405 -0.804*** -1.198*** -0.588** 
 [0.161] [0.362] [0.204] [0.420] [0.254] 
Voice and Accountability (t-1) 0.0324 0.0592 0.131 0.459 0.0744 
 [0.191] [0.399] [0.235] [0.439] [0.302] 
Rule of Law(t-1) -0.0151 0.660 0.138 -1.772* 0.402 
 [0.321] [0.749] [0.486] [1.065] [0.620] 
Political Stability (t-1) 0.0527 0.0105 0.144 0.609 -0.468** 
 [0.136] [0.282] [0.186] [0.372] [0.223] 
Government Effectiveness (t-1) -0.200 0.215 -0.450 0.473 -0.646 
 [0.380] [0.722] [0.520] [1.041] [0.576] 
Regulatory Quality (t-1) 0.878*** 0.425 1.178*** 0.949 0.394 
 [0.242] [0.515] [0.326] [0.618] [0.433] 
Control of Corruption (t-1) 0.0392 -0.760 0.0456 0.210 0.525 
 [0.264] [0.511] [0.342] [0.683] [0.520] 
Ln Growth (t-1) 0.00582 -0.00827 0.0401** 0.0534 -0.0130 
 [0.0156] [0.0219] [0.0170] [0.0344] [0.0255] 
Trade Openess (t-1) -0.00530** -0.00495 0.00196 0.0162** 0.00666 
 [0.00231] [0.00542] [0.00381] [0.00649] [0.00403] 
Ln Export (t-1) 0.359*** 0.298 0.191** 0.651*** -0.166 
 [0.0963] [0.234] [0.0882] [0.187] [0.146] 
Ln Population -1.006*** -0.884*** -0.208 -0.986*** 0.0969 
 [0.102] [0.224] [0.129] [0.307] [0.206] 
Landlocked 0.141 -0.844* 0.586* 1.593*** -0.153 
 [0.222] [0.435] [0.300] [0.574] [0.354] 
Former colony France 0.323 1.689** -0.872** -2.821*** -0.691 
 [0.244] [0.674] [0.439] [0.716] [0.486] 
Former colony UK -0.221 0.592 -1.024*** -0.237 1.474*** 
 [0.253] [0.535] [0.326] [0.684] [0.307] 
Former colony Germany -0.242 -0.544 -0.259 0.230 0.873** 
 [0.295] [0.506] [0.377] [0.780] [0.352] 
GSP Signatory -1.062*** -0.139 -0.812** 0.324 -0.320 
 [0.262] [0.587] [0.351] [0.772] [0.371] 
GSP+ Signatory -0.220 -0.442 0.514 -0.629 -0.0132 
 [0.276] [0.460] [0.335] [0.646] [0.527] 
APEC member -0.768** 0.149 -0.788* -1.859** -0.0675 
 [0.387] [0.721] [0.399] [0.793] [0.532] 
Observations 1,217 809 1,060 736 673 
R-squared 0.511 0.324 0.241 0.377 0.270 
Robust standard errors in brackets*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1    
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Robust standard errors in brackets *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Appendix 5. OLS regression excluding African recipient in the sample. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
VARIABLES Ln AfT per capita Ln AfT per capita Ln AfT per capita Ln AfT per capita Ln AfT per capita 
      
Poverty(t-1) 0.0188 0.0279 0.0425*** 0.0585 0.0288 
 [0.0168] [0.0273] [0.0148] [0.0374] [0.0216] 
Voice and Accountability (t-1) -0.0345 -0.538 0.266 -0.522 -0.136 
 [0.318] [0.496] [0.269] [0.760] [0.339] 
Rule of Law(t-1) -0.00236 1.025 0.524 0.422 1.102 
 [0.480] [0.917] [0.531] [1.169] [0.767] 
Political Stability (t-1) -0.116 -0.0218 -0.0604 0.298 -0.206 
 [0.191] [0.371] [0.244] [0.442] [0.266] 
Control of Corruption (t-1) -0.133 -0.853 -0.365 -1.729 -0.637 
 [0.376] [0.812] [0.443] [1.055] [0.677] 
Regulatory Quality (t-1) 0.874*** 0.935 0.978** 0.0497 0.984* 
 [0.329] [0.627] [0.382] [0.796] [0.497] 
Ln Growth (t-1) 0.0110 -0.0322 0.0381** 0.0647 0.00821 
 [0.0181] [0.0345] [0.0156] [0.0430] [0.0339] 
Trade Openess (t-1) -0.00491 -0.00441 -0.00293 0.0145 0.00554 
 [0.00460] [0.00832] [0.00484] [0.0103] [0.00481] 
Ln Export (t-1) 0.211 0.0132 -0.0411 0.483* -0.753*** 
 [0.135] [0.215] [0.0995] [0.287] [0.144] 
Ln Population -1.000*** -0.579** -0.327* -1.385*** 0.591*** 
 [0.130] [0.269] [0.176] [0.378] [0.202] 
Landlocked 0.0705 -1.494* 1.371*** 0.347 -0.352 
 [0.454] [0.803] [0.483] [0.911] [0.550] 
Former colony France 0.926* 1.467* -0.625 -2.490* -2.672*** 
 [0.547] [0.872] [0.870] [1.251] [0.826] 
Former colony UK -0.490 -0.795 -0.575 -0.745 1.302** 
 [0.486] [0.756] [0.470] [1.149] [0.493] 
Former colony Germany -0.641 -4.412*** -2.631*** -5.700*** 0.607 
 [0.635] [1.431] [0.714] [1.543] [1.018] 
GSP Signatory -0.429 0.929 0.737 -0.866 0.423 
 [0.474] [0.586] [0.506] [1.156] [0.450] 
GSP+ Signatory -0.257 -0.908 -0.642 0.375 -0.496 
 [0.407] [0.683] [0.456] [0.985] [0.642] 
APEC member -0.762* -0.134 -0.406 -0.947 -0.583 
 [0.450] [0.649] [0.472] [0.827] [0.610] 
      
Observations 632 413 615 410 365 
F-statistics 19.44 . 8.11 9.53 11.01 
R-squared 0.493 0.251 0.380 0.411 0.279 
